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The development of a technology-centered economy has
increased the importance of patent rights. In order for these patent
rights to have value, patentees must be able to ascertain the metes
and bounds of their patent claims. In recent years the Federal
Circuit has muddled means-plus-function claim limitation
infringement analysis governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6. Because
the Federal Circuit uses different approaches to decide claims, it
has become impossible to know the metes and bounds means-plus-
function (MPF) limitations create.
For example, in two recent cases, Kemco Sales, Inc. v.
Control Papers Co., Inc. and IMS Technology, Inc. v. Haas
Automation, Inc., the Federal Circuit has used divergent
approaches to analyze MPF claim limitation infiingement. In
Kemco, the court used the narrow approach to § 112, 6
infringement analysis, focusing on the structural equivalence of the
accused structure to the patented structure. In IMS, the court used
the contextual approach to infringement, looking at the claim
limitation's position in the context of the overall invention. This
inconsistency unjustly forces inventors to rely on litigation to
decide the scope of their patents' rights to exclude.
1 J.D. candidate 2003, University of North Carolina School of Law.
In order to promote innovation, the more logical
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 is a narrow approach
focusing on a simple structural equivalence comparison. This
Comment shows the benefits of the narrow approach over the more
complicated contextual approach.
II. Introduction and Background
As technology develops at the center of an interdependent
world economy, the importance of the patent as a means to carve
out a part of this new economy increases. Patent claims define the
metes and bounds of an invention, thereby defining the scope of
patent protection and determining the worth of the right to exclude
granted by the patent. Patent claims written in "means-plus-
function" or "step-plus-function" format (hereafter "MPF format")
define a claim limitation by what it does rather than by its
structure.
2
The MPF format may provide advantages over ordinary
structural claims for certain types of inventions. MPF language is
generally used where the function or action, rather than the specific
structure that accomplishes the action, is important.3 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, 6 governs MPF claim limitations.4 MPF format
incorporates into the limitations of the claim the embodiment
2 PETER S. CANELIAS, PATENT PRACTICE HANDBOOK, at §12.06 (2001).
3 ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING, at §
34 (2000).
4 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (1994) (stating "An element in a claim for a
combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified
function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and
such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.").
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS
disclosed in the specification and all of its equivalents, provided
there is a clear link in the specification or prosecution history
between the function recited in the claim and a particular structure
in the disclosure.5 In order to broaden the scope of means
limitations, the claim drafter should expressly recite various
alternative structural features corresponding to the means
limitation. 6 Means limitations place on the drafter a burden to
draft a broad specification. 7
Section 112, 6 was enacted as part of the Patent Act of
1952, likely in response to Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
Walker.8 Halliburton forbade the use of MPF language at the point
of novelty because the Court thought MPF elements were
overbroad and ambiguous. 9 Perhaps in response to Halliburton,
Congress enacted § 112, 6 as part of the Patent Act of 1952,
permitting the use of MPF language but providing "a standard to
make the broad claim language more definite." 10 The words of the
statute read:
An element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step for performing a
specified function without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim
shall be construed to cover the corresponding
5 FABER, supra note 3, at § 34 ("The duty to link or associate structure to
function is the quid pro quo for the convenience of employing § 112, [ ] 6.").6 See, e.g., Ishida Co. v. Taylor, 221 F.3d 1310, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
7 FABER, supra note 3, at § 34 ("...if the claim drafter recognizes the possible
equivalency issue early enough, the specification can be written to express
enough alternatives to give broad scope to a § 112, paragraph 6 limitation.").8 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
9 Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir.
1993); In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1 Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1042.
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structure, material, or acts described in the
specification and equivalents thereof.
Apparent from this language, the purpose of § 112, 6 is to
grant the inventor a fair scope that is not dependent on a catalogue
of alternative embodiments in the specification. 12 In addition to
granting a fair scope to patent grants, there is some evidence to
support the hypothesis that Congress intended § 112, 6 to codify
the application of the judicially-created doctrine of equivalents to
MPF claim limitations. 13 Unfortunately, as this Comment will
show, the interpretation of the statute has not provided the
definiteness anticipated by its drafters. 14 Uncertainty over the
legislative intent of § 112, 6 exists; the interpretation of § 112,
6 that the plain meaning of the statute is a codification of the
doctrine of equivalents has been both accepted and rejected. 15 This
Comment will argue that the plain meaning of the statute rightly
should separate the doctrine of equivalents and the § 112, 6
inquiries.
The Federal Circuit has developed a general test for MPF
claim literal infringement under § 112, 6. Provided all other
limitations of a claim are literally met, an accused structure is said
to literally infringe a MPF claim limitation if two elements are
present: (1) the accused infringing structure contains the equivalent
n See supra note 4.12 ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, at § 6.3(a)(iv) (5th
ed. 2001).13 See Julia Hodge, Comment, 112, 6 Claim Interpretation and the Doctrine of
Equivalents: An Invitation to Confused Thinking, 17 Computer & High Tech.




structure to that disclosed in the section of the specification
corresponding to the MPF limitation, 16 and (2) the relevant
structure in the accused infringing device and the structure in the
corresponding specification perform the identical function and are
insubstantially different from the MPF limitation.
17
Doctrine of equivalents non-literal infiingement developed
in the common law as a way to protect the substance of a
patentee's right to exclude when literal infringement fails. It does
so by ensuring that merely colorable differences or slight
improvements beyond the literal scope of a claim do not prevent
infringement. 18 The Federal Circuit in Kraft v. International
Trading Co. stated:
Equivalence is shown by evidence that the accused
device contains an element that is not "substantially
different" from any claim element that is literally
lacking ... or that the claimed limitation and the
accused component "perform substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to achieve
substantially the same result.' 19
16 HARMON, supra note 12.
17 See Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See
also Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
18 HARMON, supra note 12.
19 Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40
(1997) and Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 149
F.3d 1309, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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Under the tripartite function/way/result test of the doctrine
of equivalents, the fact finder must consider factors such as
the prosecution history, the pioneer-non-pioneer status of
the invention, and the prior art to make a determination of
infringement. Determination of the importance of the
limitation to the invention as a whole, often referred to as
whether the limitation is at the "point of novelty," also has
been used as a factor in doctrine of equivalents
infringement determinations.
20
Even though § 112, 6 and the doctrine of equivalents
seem very similar, there are significant differences between the
two inquiries. Equivalence analysis under § 112, 6 is essentially
the application of the doctrine of equivalence in a limited role.21
§ 112, 6 analysis uses the same tripartite function/way/result test
of the doctrine of equivalents, but § 112, 6 literal infringement
stresses functional identity, not equivalency.22 Thus, § 112, 6
equivalence is narrower than the doctrine of equivalents.
23
In addition, there is a temporal distinction between the
statutory and common law equivalence inquiries. 4 The literal
meaning of a claim fixes upon issuance, and, as such, equivalence
analysis under § 112, 6 only can concern technology in existence
at the time of issuance. 2 5 As Donald Chisum states in his treatise,
20 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
21 See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40; see also MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMRnING PROCEDURE § 2186 (2000).
22 See Odetics Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
23 id.
24 See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
25 See Chiuminatta Concrete Sys., Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303,
1310-11 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating "Even if such an element [corresponding
structure in the accused infringer] is found not to be a § 112, 6, equivalent
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however, "if the accused technology was developed after the patent
issued, infringement exists, if at all, under the common law
doctrine of equivalents. In short, a threshold determination must
be made as to when the technology embodied in the accused
product was available-pre- or post-issuance. 26
Following from this, doctrine of equivalents analysis is
precluded for MPF limitations after a § 112, 6 finding of no
literal infringement if the technology of the accused device existed
at the time of patent issuance. 27 The courts never have held that
§ 112, 6 codified the doctrine of equivalents, but the courts'
struggle to define the differences has led to confusion in MPF
claim limitation infringement as illustrated in the following cases.
II. Case Summaries
A. Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co.28
Kemco owns U.S. Patent 5,405,197 for plastic security
envelopes.29 The envelopes indicate whether the envelope has
been opened and has had its valuables removed. Previous
envelopes considered as prior art were not secure because the
adhesive securing the flaps could be heated, the contents could be
read, and the adhesive could be reapplied without any indication
because it is not equivalent to the structure disclosed in the patent, this analysis
should not foreclose it from being an equivalent under the doctrine of
equivalents.").26 DONALD S. CIRSUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 950 (2d ed. 2001).
27 Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1311.
28 Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
29 See id. at 1354-55.
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that the envelope had been opened.30 Kemco's new envelope
utilizes two sealing means. One sealing means is extremely
temperature sensitive to show tampering, and the other sealing
means physically seals the envelope.
31
Control Papers also made a security envelope. This
accused infringing envelope also utilized two adhesive layers. The
only difference in Control Papers' accused infringing envelope was
its use of a dual-lip structure rather than the single-lip structure
disclosed in Kemco's patent.
32
Kemco sued for infringement in United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. The district court granted
partial summary judgment in favor of Control Papers. Kemco
appealed, placing the infringement determination in the hands of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.33
After determining the meanings of various phrases in the
patent, the court began the infringement analysis relevant to this
discussion. The court stated that a two-pronged test governed the
analysis. First, the accused infringing product must have identical
function to the disclosed structure in the patent. Second, the
accused infringing product must be otherwise insubstantially
different with respect to structure.34 The court advocated the
modified function/way/result test partially borrowed from doctrine
of equivalents analysis.
35
The court said a key difference between the § 112, 6
infringement analysis under the modified function/way/result test
3od. at 1355.
311d.
32 1d. at 1357.
33 See id. at 1354.34 1d. at 1364.
35 id.
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and the doctrine of equivalents was that the doctrine of equivalents
requires substantially similar function while § 112, 6 requires
identical function.36 The analysis under the way and result prongs
of the doctrine of equivalents function/way/result test and the
modified function/way/result test were held to be the same.37 The
inquiry did not analyze the interchangeability of the two structures
as known by persons of ordinary skill in the art, an inquiry typical
of equivalency analysis under the doctrine of equivalents. 38
Although the court explicitly used the modified tripartite test and
an analysis of substantial similarity to decide this case, its inquiry
focused mainly on the structural equivalency. Thus, the court
implicitly used a structural test narrowly construing § 112, 6 to
require structural equivalency.
In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the accused
dual-lip envelope utilized a different way and result than the
single-lip envelope.39 The way was not equivalent because the
Control Papers envelope met together and bound via an internal
adhesive. The result was not equivalent because both of Kemco's
seals attach outside the envelope, while the first sealing means of
the Control Papers envelope attaches internally. Because the way
and result prongs show non-equivalence, infringement failed under
both § 112, 6 and the doctrine of equivalents. 4° Thus, the appeals
court upheld the district court ruling.
36id.
37 id.
38 See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir.
1998).39 Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1365.
40 id.
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B. IMS Technology, Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc.4 1
IMS has the rights to U.S. Patent 4,477,754 relating to a
control system for a CNC mill (computer numerically controlled
machine tool).42 The invention allows employees to interactively
program the mill on the machine floor. Prior art methods required
two steps: programming the desired milling operation at a remote
location, and running the program on the mill. IMS's patented
system recorded the user's inputs during interactive mill use and
saved the "session" on a physical cassette tape for future use.43
Haas's potentially infringing device utilized a floppy disk drive
and disk to save the program instead of a cassette tape.
44
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia granted summary judgment of noninfringement against
IMS. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remanded to
determine genuine issues of material fact, affirming in part and
vacating in part.45
The bulk of the opinion dealt with issues of claim
construction, but the court conducted an infringement analysis
after the claim interpretation was found incorrect.46 As in Kemco,
functional identity was required as part of a modified
function/way/result test for § 112, 6 equivalence.47 Evidence of
41 IMS Technology, Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
42 See id. at 1425-26.
431 d. at 1426.
44 id.
45 Id. at 1425.
46 See id. at 1430 (holding that problems with the District Court's claim
construction qualify as reversible errors).
47 IMS, 206 F.3d at 1435.
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known interchangeability within the relevant art was probative but
not conclusive in the analysis.48 The most significant part of the
analysis was the use of the invention's context to decide
infringement.49 The court held that if the physical part of the
invention under consideration is important to the overall structure,
then a broader range of equivalents should be found to infringe.
5 0
The court further noted that the equivalency between the two
structures need not be structural equivalence and expounded the
fact that equivalent structure is not structural equivalence.
51
Having literally the same structure is not required for literal
infringement; only equivalent structure is needed for literal
infiingement. Due to errors in claim construction and infringement
analysis, the court overturned summary judgment regarding the
equivalence of the disk and tape. 2
The IMS decision differs from the Kemco decision in that
the IMS court used the context of the claim to the overall invention
and the interchangeability of the two structures. Neither of these
inquiries was used by the Kemco court. The Kemco decision also
implied that structural equivalence should be the primary inquiry,
while the IMS court used a confusing definition of equivalent
structure and rejected structural equivalency as a valid inquiry.
The lack of a uniform standard for analyzing MPF claims
48 See id. at 1435 (stating "Evidence of known interchangeability between
structure in the accused device and the disclosed structure has also been
considered an important factor.").49 See id. at 1436 (holding "the context of the invention should be considered
when performing a § 112, 6 equivalence analysis just as it is in a doctrine of
equivalents determination.").5 Id.
51 Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (1994).
12 See IMS, 206 F.3d at 1425.
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necessitates a closer look to see what approach should be used to
increase certainty and stimulate innovation.
IV. Discussion
A. The Narrow Approach and the Contextual Approach
A focus on structural equivalence and a deconstruction or
dissection of the structures characterize the narrow approach.53
Analysis of structure is the proper construction of "structure" in
§ 112, 6 under the narrow approach's point of view.54 A
majority of recent decisions, including Kemco, support this
approach.55 The narrow approach promotes innovation and
predictability of intellectual property rights in the interpretation of
53 See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1277 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (Lourie, J., dissenting).54 See id. (stating "Analyzing any of these structures for comparison with other
structures requires analysis of their component parts. We need to focus on the
real meaning of this statutory term if we are to serve our function of clarifying
the law.").55 See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d
1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that 112, 6 equivalence is not shown by
merely the same function, equivalency of structure must also be shown). See
also Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (en banc) (holding "To determine whether a claim limitation is met
literally, where expressed as a means for performing a stated function, the court
must compare the accused structure with the disclosed structure, and must find
equivalent structure as well as identity of the claimed function for that
structure."); Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (ruling that a § 112, 6 equivalent must "(1) perform the identical
function and (2) be otherwise insubstantially different with respect to
structure.").
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claims written in means-plus-function format, thus decreasing the
breadth of potential infringement.
The contextual approach used in IMS focuses on the MPF
claim's position in the context of the "point of novelty" of the
invention. If an MPF claim is at the "point of novelty," then a
broader range of equivalents will infringe. Conversely, a MPF
claim covering any other part of the invention will have a narrow
range of equivalents and a broad range of structures which will not
infringe. This Comment argues that the range of equivalents
provided by the contextual approach is too broad. In addition, the
contextual approach improperly makes the analysis under § 112,
6 and under the doctrine of equivalents almost identical.56
B. Why the Narrow Approach Is More Certain, More Logical, and
More Equitable
Patent laws are designed to encourage innovation.
57
Certainty fosters innovation because if a patentee has prospective
knowledge of her/his patent rights, then she/he is more likely to put
energy into the innovation that leads to a patentable invention.58 In
addition, if competitors to a company with patent rights do not
know the boundaries of the competitor's patents, they will not
56 See IMS, 206 F.3d at 1436 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating "In light of the similarity
of the tests for equivalence under § 112, 6 and the doctrine of equivalents, the
context of the invention should be considered when performing a § 112, 6
equivalence analysis just as it is in a doctrine of equivalents determination").57 Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985).58 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(stating that the ability of the public to design around the language in patent
claims and build non-infringing products is one of the important public benefits
that justifies the patent grant of the right to exclude).
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develop better substitutes for fear of expensive infringement
suits.5
If certainty fosters innovation, then the next logical step is
to show that the narrow approach is more certain than the
contextual approach. The narrow approach is more certain because
it focuses on structural equivalency, which is easier to apply. It is
relatively easy to look at two structures and make one
determination about structural equivalency. It is much more
complicated, and therefore uncertain, to apply a contextual
approach which attempts to determine if the accused structure falls
within a broad or narrow equivalence scope deduced from a two-
pronged "point of novelty" inquiry. The contextual approach has
two subjective inquiries: (1) determining the point of novelty and
(2) determining if the accused structure is substantially similar
given the disposition of(l). Determining the novelty of an
invention is one main factor that makes writing a patent difficult. °
The narrow approach, however, has only one inquiry: the
substantial similarity of the two structures. Therefore, the narrow
approach is more certain because the patentee can know her/his
level of protection and competitors can innovate without fear of
infringing a vague patent.
59 Anat Hakim et al., Western District of Wisconsin Proves a Speedy and
Affordable Venue for Patent Litigation, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, October 2001, at
34 ("According to a 2001 survey conducted by the American Intellectual
Property Lawyer's Association (AIPLA), a patent litigant can expect to spend at
least $500,000 and up to $6 million to try a patent case. On average, a patent suit
in which $1 - $25 million is at risk costs $797,000 through discovery and just
under $1.5 million through trial, with some litigants reporting costs in excess of
$2.5 million. For those cases in which more than $25 million is at risk, the
average litigant can expect to spend $1.5 million through discovery and roughly
$3 million if there is a trial.").60 HARMON, supra note 12, at 17.
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Another reason the narrow approach to § 112, 6 is the
more logical interpretation is that it does not consume the doctrine
of equivalents. While § 112, 6 infiingement is literal
infringement, the contextual approach makes § 112, 6
infringement almost identical to non-literal infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents (DOE).61 The courts have repeatedly held
that there are differences between § 112, 6 and the DOE.62
Since the courts have decided that § 112, 6 and the DOE
are both to coexist in their own spheres ofjurisdiction, § 112, 6
should be constructed to have effect.63 The narrow approach gives
meaning to § 112, 6 by restricting it to the literal infiingement of
structural comparisons.64 The contextual approach, conversely,
allows § 112, 6 and DOE analysis to overlap in a way that
destroys the judicially-created differences between the two
inquiries.
The primary reasons the two inquiries melt into one under
the contextual approach are the contextual approach's use of the
"point of novelty" of the MPF claim limitation and the use of
known interchangeability of the two structures. These are both
61 See IMS at 1436 (stating "In light of the similarity of the tests for equivalence
under § 112, 6 and the doctrine of equivalents, the context of the invention
should be considered when performing a § 112, 6 equivalence analysis just as
it is in a doctrine of equivalents determination").
62 See the discussion of differences between the two inquiries in Section IV-A.
and supra notes 19-2 1.
63 See Kimberley-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911,
915 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that Congress does not legislate unnecessarily and,
therefore, an interpretation rendering a statute redundant is to be avoided).
64 See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1277 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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classic inquiries under the DOE.65 The narrow approach uses
neither of these two factors and thus correctly limits § 112, 6 to
literal infringement only. The Federal Circuit has held, "It is only
when the changes are so insubstantial as to result in a fraud on the
patent that equitable [DOE] becomes desirable., 66 Structural
changes governed by § 112, 6 are substantial; therefore,
application of the DOE to structural changes is unnecessary. The
contextual approach effectively applies the DOE, not a plain
meaning § 112, 6 analysis, to structural changes. This is
unnecessary and incorrect.
Patents are statutory grants of a limited monopoly to an
inventor by the government in return for a full disclosure of the
invention. 67 Since patent rights originated in the legislative
branch, control over patent laws should remain true to the spirit of
congressional intent in drafting § 112, 6.68 The narrow approach
takes power away from judges when deciding infringement cases
by limiting their inquiry to a comparison of the structure disclosed
in the specification with its equivalents. 69 In contrast, the
contextual approach gives judges much more power to decide
65 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)
(stating in relation to a DOE determination: "what constitutes equivalency must
be determined against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular
circumstances of the case. Equivalency, in patent law, is not a prisoner of
formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum.").
66 Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus. Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir.
1991).67 See generally HARMON, supra note 12, at §§ 1.1(a) and 18.2.
68 But see Hodge, supra note 13, at 218.
69 See Signtech USA Ltd. v. Vutek Inc., 174 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(stating "[B]ecause of the statutory limitations governing the meaning of means-
plus-function elements, courts must limit the scope of these claim elements to
the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification and its equivalents").
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
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cases in a result-oriented way by granting them an essentially non-
literal infringement inquiry. The power to bail out bad patent
drafting with a contextual approach to infringement analysis
should not be given to the judiciary.
C. Problems With the Narrow Approach Dispelled
A potential problem of the narrow approach is that its
application, with its focus on structure, could allow trivial
substitutes by competitors to avoid infringement.70 While it is true
that the narrow approach puts a greater demand on the patent
drafter to include alternatives in the specification, 71 the narrow
approach does not preclude the use of the DOE in all
circumstances.72 The DOE is precluded from use where the
technology of the accused infringer existed at the time the patent
was written.73 However, where the technology did not exist at the
time of filing, the DOE applies in full force to protect the inventor
from anything but substantial changes that have a nonequivalent
function, way, or result.74 The seemingly inequitable result when
proper alternatives are not included in the specification is a small
70 Eva M. Ogielska, Means-Plus-Functions Claims: IMS Technology, Inc. v.
Haas Automation, Inc. & Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 16 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 71 (2001).
71 See FABER, supra note 3.
72 See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d
1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that where the equivalence issue involves a
later-developed technology, a § 112, 6 finding of nonequivalence does not
preclude a subsequent doctrine of equivalents inquiry).
73 See id.
74 See, e.g., Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int. Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
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price to pay for certainty. Proper specification drafting can
eliminate the problem entirely.
Another seeming inequity of the narrow approach is that it
discriminates against inventions better suited to structural claims.
While including alternatives for every MPF limitation used in the
claims may seem tedious, it is the price for the privilege of using
MPF language.75 Some commentators have suggested using
structural claims with detailed "definitions" sections to eliminate
the need to use MPF claim construction at all.76 The use of a
"definitions" section would define non-generic terms and eliminate
the advantage of structural claim usage possessed by an invention
with generically describable parts.
D. Application of the Narrow Approach to IMS Technology, Inc.
v. Haas Automation, Inc.
In 1981, at the time of the IMS patent filing, both cassette
tapes and diskettes were used to store information. As such, both
should have been included in the specification of the IMS patent.7
7
They were not, and because they were not, a court using the
narrow approach would find no infiingement in IMS.
The courts should not give a windfall to the patentee by
expanding the scope of the patent beyond what is included in the
75 See FABER, supra note 3.
76 CHISUm, supra note 26, at 950.
77 IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (finding "In the embodiment disclosed in the written description of the
'754 patent, a program may be stored permanently on a tape cassette by means
of a tape cassette transport included in the control. The written description of




specification. 78 As stated previously, this puts a burden on the
drafter, but not a burden disproportionate to the benefit of using the
MPF limitation format.7 9
This analysis of the IMS case assumes that IMS could not
prove that the technology was not in existence at the time of the
patent filing. If the patentee could convince the fact-finder that
disks did not exist at the time of the filing, the DOE would work to
bail out the patentee and compel the use of the DOE to analyze
infringement. Infringement under the DOE, in this case, would
likely lead to a finding of infringement.8"
E. Why the Kemco Court's Narrow Approach Yielded a Logical
Decision That Promotes Innovation
The internal attachment means used by the accused
infringer in Kemco was substantially different and structurally not
equivalent to the internal attachment means disclosed in the
patent.81 From looking at the two structures, they were not
equivalent.82 The contextual approach would likely cause a court
to labor over determining the point of novelty of the inventions and
deciding whether they are pioneering. It is anyone's guess what
78 D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding
that a court may not read narrow claim limitations into broader claims to escape
infringement).
7 9 See FABER, supra note 3.
80 Since the contextual approach and the DOE are essentially similar, the court's
finding of infringement under the contextual approach in IMS suggests a finding
of infringement under the same facts if DOE analysis is applied.
81 Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2000).82 Id. ("[I]t is clear that the fold-over flap structure disclosed in the '197 patent
specification is not identical to the dual-lip structure in the accused device").
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the outcome would be under a contextual approach, and this author
does not need to speculate an outcome.
The accused infringer in Kemco was able to design around
the patented means and find a different way to achieve the same
function.83 This displays how the narrow approach fosters
innovation by allowing a competitor to design a dissimilar
structure and improve on the old way of accomplishing a function.
If the difference between the two structures was
insubstantial, the accused structure should have been an alternative
disclosed in the specification. 84 The logical conclusion, and the
conclusion reached by the court in Kemco, is that the change from
a single-lip structure to a dual-lip structure was substantial and the
accused structure does not infringe.
V. Conclusion
As shown by the inconsistencies between IMS and Kemco,
the Federal Circuit has muddled the treatment of MPF claim
limitations. These two decisions use two different approaches to
analyze infringement of MPF claim limitations under § 112, 6.
IMS used the contextual approach to infringement, looking at the
claim limitation's position in the context of the overall invention.
Kemco used the narrow approach to § 112, 6 infringement
analysis, focusing on the structural equivalence of the accused
structure to the patented structure. The court must decide on a
single approach to infringement of MPF limitations to provide
certainty in the negative right to exclude granted by patents.
83 Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1365 (holding that the function of the two structures is
identical, but the way and result of accomplishing the function used by the
accused structure is substantially different).84 See FABER, supra note 3.
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In order to promote innovation through certainty in patent
scope, the logical interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 is a narrow
one focusing on a simple structural equivalence comparison. This
Comment advocates the narrow approach over the more
complicated contextual approach. The narrow approach is more
certain because its structural equivalence comparison is more
objective than the contextual approach. The burden on the
patentee to draft her/his claims more carefully is a small price to
pay for a patent with definite value. Additionally, the narrow
approach allows the doctrine of equivalents and § 112, 6
infringement analyses to remain separate judicial inquiries, thereby
construing the statute in a meaningful way. Finally, the narrow
approach takes away the judiciary's power to legislate which
would exist under the contextual approach.
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